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Notes and Comments
MATURE ADJUDICATION: INTERPRETIVE CHOICE IN RECENT
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Bernard E. Harcourt*

INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment presents a "hard" case for adjudication. 1 It
provokes sharp conflict between competing constitutional interpretations and invariably raises questions of judicial bias. This is particularly
true in the new Republic of South Africa, where the framers of the
interim constitution deliberately were silent regarding the legality of
the death penalty.2 The tension is of equivalent force in the United
States, where recent expressions of core constitutional rights have raised
potentially irreconcilable conflicts in the application of capital punishment.
Two recent death penalty decisions-the South African Constitutional Court opinions in State v. Makwanyane and the United States
* Senior Fellow, Graduate Program, Harvard Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989;
A.B., Princeton University, 1984. Mr. Harcourt was a trial and appellate attorney representing
capital defendants in Montgomery, Alabama, and also served as assistant to the Mosuenyane
Commission of Inquiry in Johannesburg, South Africa from June to August 1993. The Motsuenyane Commission was appointed by Nelson Mandela to investigate allegations of human rights
abuses and alleged disappearances among members of the African National Congress.
The author is extremely grateful to Seyla Benhabib, Jorge Esquirol, Frank Michelman, Martha
Minow, Lewis Sargentich, and Carol Steiker for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. Hard cases are those that provoke sharp conflict between interpretive choices, strain constitutional interpretation and produce heated moral debate in the public sphere. Hard cases
include, for instance, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), see Ronald M. Dworkin, Hard Cases, in
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 125 (1977); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), see Frank
I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE I.J. 1493 (1988); and the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872), see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAsN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 95 (1991).
2. See Judgment of June 6, 1995 (State v. Makwanyane and Another), Constitutional Court
No. CCT13194, at 408B-09A; infra note 10 and accompanying text. As this Comment goes to
press, the South African Constitutional Assembly is debating final terms of the new constitution
which may clarify the issue. Two alternatives of the right to life provision have been proposed.
The first provides that "[e]veryone has the right to life [and the death penalty is hereby
abolished]." The second provides that "Everyone has the right to life, and the right not to be
deprived of life except by execution of a court sentence following conviction for a crime for which
the death penalty is prescribed by an Act of Parliament." S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 10 (Working
Draft of Nov. 22, 1995). This clearly "could mean the reintroduction of capital punishment."
First Draft of New South African Constitution Unveiled, Agence France Presse, Nov. 22, 1995,
available in LEXIS, AFP File.
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Supreme Court opinions in Callins v. Collins3-reflect the critical role
of interpretive choice in capital adjudication. They demonstrate that
the ultimate legal decision regarding capital punishment invariably is
resolved by a normative choice among competing values, and that the
competing normative choices equally support liberal constitutional
aspirations.
A comparison of these two decisions offers, through the lens of the
South African court, a visionary model of judicial decisionmaking-a
model of "mature adjudication."4 It is mature because it incorporates
liberal aspirations within the larger context of an open and transparent
discussion about values. It is also mature in its attentiveness to, and
respect for, the experiences and opinions of judicial colleagues in the
international community.
This Comment explores the contributions of the Makwanyane and
Callins decisions to our evolving concept of adjudication. Part I explores the interpretive choices made by the two courts. Part II discusses
the particular vision of "mature adjudication" offered by the South
African court, and Part III comments upon the South African court's
use of comparative law.

I. INTERPRETIVE CHOICE IN CAPITAL ADJUDICATION
A. The Makwanyane Opinions
In State v. Makwanyane, a remarkable set of nine separate opinions
issued June 6, 1995, the South African Constitutional Court abolished
capital punishment for general crimes. 5 Constitutional Court President
Chaskalson ruled that the death penalty violates the prohibition on
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" set forth in
section 11(2) of the interim constitution-as informed by the rights
to life and dignity contained in sections 9 and 10-and that no clear
and convincing case had yet been made to justify a limitation of these
rights. 6 Chaskalson concluded that "[these] rights are the most important
of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights in [the
interim constitution) ....
This must be demonstrated by the State
in everything that it does, including the way it punishes criminals."7
3. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
4. "Mature" does not signify abolitionist-it relates to the type of jurisprudence, not content
(political or moral views). Mature, in this sense, has its roots in concepts of moral development
and how we, as individuals, deal with the tension between rules and indeterminacy. See infra part
II.
5. The court explicitly reserved judgment on the propriety of capital punishment for treason.
See Makwanyane, No. CCT/3/95, at 452F (Chaskalson).
6. Id. at 451G-52A.
7. Id. at 451C-D.
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The court's judgment reflects an extremely difficult interpretive
choice, for Makwanyane presents the truly hard case where constitution
framers explicitly and deliberately avoided resolution of the constitutionality of the challenged practice. As Chaskalson explains, the framers "neither sanctioned nor excluded" the death penalty, but, instead,
agreed on a "Solomonic solution" whereby the Constitutional Court
would decide whether the death penalty was consistent with the interim constitution.9
Accordingly, the traditional grounds of decision are not present in
Makwanyane. There can be no recourse to the intent of the framers and,
as a result, the actual language of the constitution offers little guidance.
Although the constitutional text refers to an unqualified right to life,
it also contains a separate "limitations clause."' 10 There is no domestic
precedent on point to help adjudicate the issue, and few prior decisions
from which to extrapolate legal principles." Moreover, public sentiment appeared to favor the death12 penalty; at least, Chaskalson was
"prepared to assume that it does.'
A forcefil argument was made that, because the interim constitution
3
was silent, the court should leave the decision to elected representatives.'
The court responded, however, that "[ilt is for the Court, and not
society or Parliament, to decide whether the death sentence is justifiable
under the provisions of section 33 of our Constitution."'14 South Africa
had adopted a system of judicial review, and with it, a new role for its
Constitutional Court.
Remarkably, the new responsibility that this young court has assumed is to engender a culture of rights. As Chaskalson explains, "In the
long run more lives may be saved through the inculcation of a rights
culture, than through the execution of murderers." 15 Justice Langa

8. Id. at 408B, 409A.
9. It would be blinking reality to suggest, however, that the "Solomonic solution" was entirely
neutral. Under the agreement, the constitutional assembly abdicated to a court whose members
were going to be appointed by the next president of the republic-which most people knew
would be Nelson Mandela.
10. S. Ant. CONST. ch. 3, § 33 (Interim Constitution). The "limitations clause" provides that
rights, including the right to life, may be limited where "a clear and convincing case" justifies
restriction. Makwanyane at 440A-B.
11. The only prior decision (post-interim constitution) that the court references is the Judgment of April 5, 1995 (State v. Zuma and Two Others) Constitutional Court, No. CCT/5/94
(addressing the right to counsel). See Makwanyane, No. CCT/3/94 at 403C-D n.6; id. at 415H
n.53; id. at 435C-D.
12. Makwaryane, No. CCT/3/94 at 4301-3 lB.
13. This position was stated in briefs and argument. See id at 404C-E. Throughout the court's
judgment and the concurring opinions, the justices address this argument. See, eg., id. at 408A-C,
437F, 438B (Chaskalson); id at 467J-68G (Didcott, J., concurring); id. at 469D-F, 474B
(Kentridge, J., concurring); id. at 486H-87A (Madala, J. concurring); id. at 489B-F (Mahomed,
J., concurring); id. at 511E-G (Sachs, J.,concurring).
14. Id. at 441E-G (Chaskalson).
15. Id. at 444F (Chaskalson) (emphasis added).
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develops this goal further in equally striking terms: "[a] culture of
respect for human life and dignity, based on the values reflected in the
16
Constitution, has to be engendered, and the State must take the lead."'
The values that the court attempts to inculcate are based on international human rights norms and liberal aspirations as well as African
cultural traditions. The structure of rights is built upon the right to
life and dignity found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
In this sense, the Makwanyane opinion, as well as the interim constitution, are shaped by the human rights movement. Yet, the structure
of rights reflects a liberal aspiration to foundational rights, the rule of
law, and neutrality. The opinions make clear that South Africa is "a
constitutional State in which the rights of individuals are guaranteed
by the Constitution."'18
The structure of rights also embraces a return to traditional South
African values. In particular, at the heart of the Makwanyane opinions
is the value of ubuntu, a concept given legal recognition in the concluding provision on National Unity and Reconciliation, which forms
part of the interim constitution. 19
Ubuntu places emphasis "on communality and on the interdependence of the members of a community, '20 all of whom are "entitled to
unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance."'21 "[Ubuntu] regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and
co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all." 22 Ubuntu
is a basic respect for life and dignity, and is foundational to the
23
structure of rights in the interim constitution.
The Makwanyane court is self-consciously engendering a liberal culture of rights, which is both founded upon human rights and informed
by indigenous values. In forming such a culture, the court openly
discusses "the underlying values of the Constitution. '24 These are in16. Id. at 472B (Langa, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
17. Universal
Declarationof Human Rights, adoptedDec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (Ill), 3 U.N.
Doc A/810 (1948), art. 3, ("[elveryone has the right to life"), art. 5, ("En]o one shall be subjected
to... torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
18. Makwanyane, No. CCT/3/94 at 480A (Langa, J., concurring); see also id at 454C (Ackermann, J.,
concurring).
19. See Makwanyane, No. CCT/3/94 at 446C-F (Chaskalson); id. at 480G-81A (LInga, J.,
concurring); id at 4831-84A (Madala, J., concurring); id. 488G-I (Mahomed, J., concurring); id.
at 500H-O1G (Mokgoro, J., concurring); id. at 516F-G (Sachs, J., concurring). Ubmniu is a term
shared in a number of African languages. It means "humanity" in Xhosa, se ENGLISH-X-IOSA
DiCriONARY 284 (1985), and "human nature" in Zulu, see ENGLISH-ZULU, ZULU-ENGLISH
DIcrIoNARY (first combined ed., 1990).
20. Makwanyane, No. CCT/3194 at 481A (langa, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 481B (Langa, J., concurring).

22. Id. at 481C (Langa, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 484A (Madala, J.,concurring); id. at 501C (Mokgoro, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 403D; see also id. at 423B ("the values of our Constitution and the new order
established by it").
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terpretive choices. After all, the court explicitly recognizes that "[clapital punishment is not prohibited by public international law." 25 Thus,
the court is generating a rights structure that not only departs from
the American model of due process but also from international human
rights models.
And the court's choice is remarkable, first, because of its content. In
his preface to Frantz Fanon's Les Damnes de la Terre, Jean-Paul Sartre
is
writes that "the marks of violence, no tenderness will erase them: it 27
26
pen,
the
of
stroke
a
With
them."
destroy
can
alone
that
violence
however, the South African court displaces the need for violent praxis
and replaces it with ubuntu. The court proclaims that the country's long
history of violence does not trigger a need for more violence, but
28
instead a call for ubuntu.
The court's choice is also remarkable in its self-confidence, particularly in such a young democracy where fundamental political decisions
are still being made. The court places itself at the very center of.
value-formation. The court and the State become the "role model" for
the country:
Implicit in the provisions and tone of the Constitution are
values of a more mature society, which relies on moral persuasion rather than force; on example rather than coercion. In
this new context, then, the role of the State becomes clear.
For good or for worse, the State is a role model for our society.
A culture of respect for human life and dignity, based on the
values reflected in the Constitution, has to be engendered,
and the State must take the lead ....

[The State] demon-

strates in the best way possible, by example, society's own
life and dignity by refusing to destroy that
regard for human
29
of the criminal.
The court resolves its interpretive dilemma by means of a normative
and transparent discussion about values that, ultimately, promotes
liberal aspirations. The decision is not arbitrary or unrestricted, but
constrained by a culture, by liberal aspirations, and, most importantly,
by a historical moment. The Makwanyane court is at the pivotal mo25. Id. at 414C; see also id. at 434E, 414H. The death penalty is condoned in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
26. Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface to Las D~mNES DE LA TEsRuE 20 (1961) (translated by author).
27. A great challenge in South Africa is how the country will deal with the increasing levels
of violence. Indeed, the stroke of the pen may not stand up against the rising tide of public
sentiment. See Suzanne Daley, Blacks in South Africa Turn to Vigilantes as Crime Soars, N.Y TIMEs,
Nov. 27, 1995, at Al.
28. Afakuanyane, No. CCT/3/94 at 481G-82A (langa, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 480C-E (langa, J., concurring); see also id. at 444D-F (Chaskalson).
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ment in its history-it is choosing a constitutional culture for the
nation. This is "the constitutional moment" when, by analogy to the
American experience, "We The People establish our own sovereignty
30
by legislating to ourselves a supreme law."
B. The Calins Opinions
In his dissenting opinion in Callins v. Collins, issued February 22,
1994, former Justice Harry A. Blackmun declares: "From this day
forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death."'M
Blackmun argues that the Supreme Court's efforts to reconcile conflicting constitutional commands in the imposition of capital punishment
have failed. Blackmun concludes that "the proper course when faced
with irreconcilable constitutional commands is not to ignore one or
the other, nor to pretend that the dilemma does not exist, but to admit
32
the futility of the effort to harmonize them."
In contrast to Makwanyane, Callins was not decided at the birth of
a nation, nor does it represent a great turning point in constitutional
history. Yet it, too, reflects the inescapably normative content of capital
adjudication. The Callins opinions present a genuine dilemma of interpretive choice, principally--and ironically-because Justice Antonin
Scalia agrees with Blackmun that the constitutional commands confronting courts in death penalty cases are ultimately irreconcilable. 33
As Blackmun indicates, the incompatible constitutional commands
of the right to consistency and the right to individuality each have
their roots in liberal political theory and in the language and ideology
of the American constitutional tradition. 34 Blackmun describes the
right to consistency as "the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration of death" 35-a fundamental tenet of due process. On the other hand, the right to individualized sentencing in death penalty cases speaks directly to the goal of
individual freedom-"an equally essential component of fundamental
36
fairness."
Blackmun argues-and Scalia agrees-that these two fundamental
rights are irreconcilably in conflict. "Experience has shown that the
consistency and rationality promised in Furman are inversely related to
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Michelman, supra note 1, at 1509; see also 1 AcKmiN, supra note 1, at 171-72.
Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1137.
Callins, 114 S. Cc. at 1128 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1128 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Carol Steiker & Jordan M.

Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Re?ections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 366-70 (1995).
35. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
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the fairness owed the individual when considering a sentence of death.
A step toward consistency is a step away from fairness."37 According to
Blackmun, a reconciliation of the two ideals is impossible. "The
consistency promised in Furman and the fairness to the individual
demanded in Lockett are not only inversely related, but irreconcilablein
the context of capital punishment."3"
Blackmun would resolve the conflict by, at least temporarily, prohibiting capital punishment. His resolution is interesting-and paradoxical. As discussed earlier, both rights derive from liberal political
theory, yet the concept of an irreconcilable conflict is a classic illustra39
tion of critical jurisprudence or, more particularly, of the conflict thesis.
At the same time, however, Blackmun's resolution ultimately accords
with the mainstream jurisprudential argument for the rule of law-the
argument that ours is a government of laws and not of men. Blackmun
does not impose a value from outside the American constitutional
culture to fill in the void created by the conflict. He does not argue
that changing norms of an evolving society resolve the conflict by
prohibiting the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. Instead,
Blackmun stays entirely within the liberal framework of rights and the
constitutional culture of the Bill of Rights.
Scalia emphasizes that "Justice Blackmun joins those of us who have
acknowledged the incompatibility of the Court's [right to consistency]
'
and [right to individuality] lines of jurisprudence."40
For Scalia, however, the answer is not to prohibit capital punishment until a reconciliation can be reached, but rather to overrule prior decisions articu41
lating the right to individualized sentencing in death penalty cases.
And it is here that the judges are faced with an inescapable normative choice between two positions that are both consistent with, and
supportive of, liberal political theory. Both resolutions represent an
37. Id at 1132 (emphasis added). In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam),
the United States Supreme Court declared the death penalty as then administered unconstitutional because of the lack of constraints on the discretion of sentencing juries.
38. Callins, 114 S. Cr. at 1136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), the Supreme Court held that the sentencing authority in a death penalty case could not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense.
39. See, ag., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685 (1976) (discussing the conflict between individualism and altruism in private law
adjudication); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AmERICAN lAw- 1780-1860,
at 197 (1977) (discussing the conflict between the will theory of contract law and the later
objective theory in private law adjudication); Karl E. Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the
1980s: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 336, 340 (1982) ("Legal reasoning is a texture of
openness, indeterminacy, and contradiction.").'
40. Callins, 114 S.Ct. at 1128 (Scalia, J.,concurring).
41. Id. ("Surely a different conclusion commends itself-to wit, that at least one of these
judicially announced irreconcilable commands which cause the Constitution to prohibit what its
text explicitly permits must be wrong.").
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interpretive choice between four distinct sets of values, each of which
are foundational to liberal democracy. These four values are: first, and
not in order of importance, the value of consistency captured in the
ideal that the death penalty should be meted out on objective standards
rather than by whim or caprice; second, the value of individualized
death penalty sentencing that is reflected in the aspiration that we only
punish individuals capitally in relation to their own culpability and
moral responsibility; third, the value of stability associated with a
written constitution, which we might call the value of-textualism; and
fourth, the value of stability associated with stare decis.
Scalia's position is that the first two sets of rights are merely "judicially announced," were "invented without benefit of any textual or
historical support," 42 and therefore must take second seat to the third
principle. For Scalia, this is not a matter of interpretive choice, but
rather a neutral rule of constitutional interpretation. Capital punishment is explicitly recognized in the Constitution, and therefore, Scalia
argues, capital punishment and textualism take priority. Blackmun,
however, does not write capital punishment out of the Constitution.
He recognizes that the death penalty per se does not violate the Constitution. It is the death penalty "as currently administered" that
invades core values of the Constitution.43 He acknowledges that "[plerhaps one day this Court will develop procedural rules or verbal formulas that actually will provide consistency, fairness, and reliability in a
capital-sentencing scheme."' Blackmun's argument, then, is that the
values of consistency and individualized sentencing are at the core of
American constitutionalism and, so long as they cannot be reconciled,
preclude the execution of the death penalty.
Ultimately, this disagreement between Blackmun and Scalia brings
us to the locus of interpretive choice and value-formation. Whether we
view the choice as being between these competing values, or between
rules of constitutional interpretation, the resolution still calls for a
normative choice between liberal aspirations. Choosing the right to
individualized sentencing over the value of textualism-or the reverse-is not barred by liberal discourse. It is, instead, a different
calibration of liberal values. One answer may be more "wrong," 45 but
only in relation to a normative choice between competing liberal
premises and aspirations. Thus, what is so significant and revealing
about Callins is that both Blackmun's and Scalia's resolutions of the

42. Id.
43. Id. at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

44. Id.
45. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1128 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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interpretive dilemma reflect and promote liberal aspirations to foundational rights and the rule of law.
II. THE VISION OF MATURE ADJUDICATION
While the Callins and Makwanyane opinions expose the inevitable
dilemma of interpretive choice in capital adjudication, they offer two
very different resolutions. The Makwanyane opinions offer a vision of
transparent adjudication that articulates the values that underlie the
interpretive choice, making them available for criticism. The Makwanyane opinions are mature because they recognize and embrace, instead
of fear, the normative content of adjudication. It is an approach that
"gives expression to the underlying values of the Constitution," 46 while
at the same time controlling subjectivity through the medium of
transparency and open dialogue about the values in the constitutional
history and culture. As Justice Mokgoro explains in her concurring
opinion:
By articulating rather than suppressing values which underlie
our decisions, we are not being subjective. On the contrary,
we set out in a transparent and objective way the foundations
of our47interpretive choice and make them available for criticism.
The fear of interpretive choice can lead to an artificial formalism that
can be as tyrannical as rampant subjectivity. The solution is not to hide
behind an artificial neutrality, but rather to genuinely expose the values
that underlie the interpretive choice and to place those values within
the framework of an open debate about constitutional, historical and
cultural constraints. This framework of limitations ensures that "the
methods to be used are essentially legal, not moral or philosophical. ' 48
In an abstract sense, the concept of mature adjudication owes much
to contemporary theories of jurisprudence, especially those of Ronald
Dworkin and Frank Michelman. Although the justices of the South
49
African Constitutional Court make reference to Dworkin's thought,
46.
(State
47.
48.

Makwayane, No. CCT3194 at 403D (Chaskalson); see also Judgment of April 5, 1995
v. Zuma and Two Others), Constitutional Court, No. CCT/5/94, (S. Mr.).
Makwayane, No. CCT/3/94 at 499D (Mokgoro, J., concurring).
Id. at 476B (Kriegler, J., concurring). The framework of discussion and debate may provide

sufficient constraint and may eliminate the need for judges to hold inaccurate beliefs, in contrast
to what Scott Altman argues in Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 396 (1990).
49. See, ag., Makwanyane, No. CCT/3194 at 457F-58A (Ackermann, J., concurring) ("I have
no doubt that even on a court composed of members of the gena Hercules and Athena there
would in many cases be differences of opinion, incapable of rational elucidation, on whether to
impose the death penalty in a particular case, where its imposition was ... dependent on the
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it would be presumptuous to impute more than an abstract, conceptual
lineage to the following analysis.
The central project of liberal political theory has been to sever the
Aristotelian equation of law, politics and morality. From its earliest
expressions to its most contemporary versions, the goal of liberalism
has been to allow individuals to pursue their own conception of the
good, rather than those imposed by government, society, or other
individuals.50 The traditional way to separate law from morality has
been to discern a structure of rights that precedes the determination
of the good life, and to embody those rights in a structure of liberal
political institutions.
The role of neutrality within the liberal project translates, in mainstream jurisprudence, into the maxim that judges should decide cases
without imposing their own values. 51 This is the notion that "[j]udges
should apply the law that other institutions have made; they should
not make new law,"52 in order that we will be "governed by laws and
not men." 53 The Legal Realists mounted a forceful challenge to this
argument in the 1920s and 1930s, 54 but it nevertheless survives until
today at the heart of jurisprudential debate.
Ronald Dworkin offers a vision of adjudication that, while consonant
with the neutrality argument, 55 recognizes the role of moral judgment
in adjudication. Dworkin proposes that judges resolve cases on the
basis of principles that provide consistency and fairness to the parties

application of widely formulated criteria and the exercise of difficult value judgments."); id. at
507E (O'Regan, J., concurring).
50. Thomas Hobbes wrote, referring to Aristotle, that "there is no such Finis ultimus (utmost
ayme) nor Summum Bonum (greatest Good) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Moral
Philosophers." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 160 (C.B. Macpherson, ed., 1985) (1914); sce also
id. at 225. As recently as 1971, John Rawls wrote, at least implicitly referring to Aristotle, that
"[w]e should therefore reverse the relation between the right and the good proposed by teleological doctrines and view the right as prior." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUtiscE 560 (1971).
51. I call this mainstream jurisprudence because, "[i]n their confirmation hearings, most
candidates for judicial office still profess fidelity to the classical vision of adjudication," which
holds, as a central tenet, that ours is a government of laws, not of men. WiLI W. FISHER III
ET AL., AmERICAN LEGAL REAusm at xv (1993); see also RONALD M. DWORI.IN, LAW'S EMPIRE3
7-8 (1986) (discussing the popular view that judges should follow the law, rather than improve
it).
52. Ronald M. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975).
53. Michelman, supra note 1, at 1500.
54. See, eg., Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflia of Laws, 37 YALE LJ. 468,
479 (1928) ("The ideal of a government of laws and not of men is a dream."). As Edward Purcell
has observed of the Legal Realists, "[tihe most important practical point of their argument was
questioning and in many cases rejecting the idea of a government of laws rather than of men."
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEiocRATic THEORY 88 (1973).
55. Ronald Dworkin in fact anchors his "rights thesis"-the theory that rational resolution of
legal disputes is, can and should be generated by a unified structure of legal principles--in "Et~he
familiar story[ ) that adjudication must be subordinated to legislation." Dworkin, supra note 52,
at 1061.

1996 / Notes and Comments: Mature Adjudication
and that make sense of precedent, tradition, and text-all the while
recognizing that this task involves a normative judgment rather than
a purely literalist, originalist or objective application of legal principles. "Community morality," Dworkin argues, "is the political morality
presupposed by the laws and institutions of the community. [The
Herculean judge] must, of course, rely on his own judgment as to what
the principles of that morality are, but this form of reliance . . . at
56
some level is inevitable."
Frank Michelman seeks to enrich the neutrality argument by recognizing and valuing 57 republican jurisgenerative politics in adjudication.
"Jurisgenerative politics" refers to the process of ongoing moral discussion, evaluation, and revision among citizens that results in legal
resolution that is not experienced as coercive. 58 The actual process is
one "in which private-regarding 'men' become public-regarding citizens and thus members of a people. It would be by virtue of that
people-making quality that the process would confer upon its law-like
issue the character of law binding upon all as self-given." 59 What
makes the process jurisgenerative is that through it, the law is received
by its subjects as theirs-they can regard themselves as "actually
agreeing that those utterances, issuing from that process, warrant being
promulgated as law." 60 This process is, according to Michelman, experienced most often by citizens outside the formal channels of law.
The South African court offers a vision of adjudication that, like
Dworkin's theory, acknowledges the moral dimension of the law-the
"community morality" presupposed by the laws and institutions. Like
Michelman's jurisgenerative politics, it emphasizes dialogue, self-revision and normativity, as well as the aspiration that laws be received as
self-given and not experienced as coercive. The South African court
also shares Michelman's ideals of refounding, renewing and renovation.
It is in this sense that the process is one of maturation.

56. Id. at 1105. In this sense, Dworkin rejects the extreme form of the neutrality argument,
and ultimately concludes that the judge must not defer to the elected representatives or to public
opinion. See ia at 1109 ("[Some] argue that since judges are fallible they should submit questions
of institutional right raised by hard cases to someone else. But to whom? There is no reason to
credit any other particular group with better facilities of moral argument; or, if there is, then it
is the process of selecting judges, not the techniques of judging that they are asked to use, that
must be changed.").
57. This is the sense in which republicanism, in Michelman's words, "is not optional with us."
Michelman, supra note 1, at 1503.
58. Id. at 1502, 1506, 1526-27.
59. Id. at 1502.
60. Id. at 1526.
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III. COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS: PEER-DEFINITION
AND SELF-DEFINITION
It is paradoxical that such a young court could offer such a mature
vision of adjudication. The South African court reconciles this paradox
by means of comparative law. Analyses of foreign decisions constitute
the most significant portion of the Makwanyane opinions. Through
these analyses, the South African court appropriates for itself a place
among the world leaders. Whether the court is discussing the role of
framers' intent, 61 concluding that the death penalty is cruel and inhuman,62 or interpreting the "limitations clause" of the interim constitution,63 the South African court is in constant dialogue with the
leading judicial institutions of the United States, the United Nations,
61
Germany, the European Union, Canada, India and elsewhere.
At the same time, the court distinguishes itself from its self-selected
peers. 65 This is demonstrated well by Chaskalson's treatment of American law. By constant and repeated references to American death penalty
jurisprudence, Chaskalson communicates that the court's most important peers are the courts of the United States. In the highly self-reflective manner called for in recent comparative scholarship, 66 and in a
61. On this issue, Chaskalson seeks the company of the United States, Germany, Canada,
India, the European Community, and the United Nations. See Makwanyane, No. CC73/94 at
405G-06D.
62. On this issue, Chaskalson surrounds himself with ideas of the United Nations Committee
on Human Rights, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, "three judges of the Canadian Supreme
Court," and the state supreme courts of Massachusetts and California. Makwanyane, No. CCT/3194
at 432D-E.
63. On this issue, Chaskalson places himself next to the United States Supreme Court, the
Canadian Supreme Court, the German Constitutional Court, and the European Court of Human
Rights. Makwanyane, No. CCT3194 at 435D-G, 436G-37D, 438B-F, 438F-39E.
64. President Chaskalson's opinion alone discusses rulings of the United States Supreme Court,
see, eg., id. at 405G-06D, 410G-I n.35, 415F-17B, 420E-, 421E-22D, 434F; the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, see, e.g., id. at 432D-E, 432F-G; the California Supreme Court, sce,
eg., id. at 432E-F, 434F-G, 445E; the Hungarian Constitutional Court, see, e.g., id at 429H-30F;
the German Constitutional Court, see, eg., id. at 406A, 423B-C, 438B-F, 446G, 448A; the Privy
Council, see, e.g., id at 4201 n.3; the Canadian Supreme Court, see, e.g., id. at 406A-B, 423D24A-E, 436G-38B; the Tanzanian Court of Appeals, see, &g., id. at 440H-41F; the Supreme
Court of India, see, eg., id at 406B-C, 426G-29C; the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, see, e.g., id
at 402H-I n.3, 4521 n.170; the European Court of Human Rights, see, e.g., id at 406D,
425F-26A, 429D, 438F-39E; and the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, se, e.g.,
id at 406D, 424E-25F, 429E-G. This is precisely what was envisioned by the interim constitution, which specifically provides that "fi]n interpreting the provisions of [the Bill of Rights] a
court of law shall . . . have regard to public international law . . . and may have regard to
comparable foreign case law." S. AFR. CONSr. § 35(1) (Interim Constitution); sce Makuanyane,
No. CCT13/94 at 423E-F.
65. Regarding the "limitations clause," for instance, Chaskalson sees "no reason... to attempt
to fir our analysis . . . into the pattern followed by any of the other courts to which reference
has been made." Makwanyane, No. CCT13/94 at 439G.
66. See Gunter Frankenberg, CriticalComparisons: Re-thinking ComparativeLaw, 26 Hm. INT'L
UJ. 411, 443 (1985) ("Instead of pretending to the posture of a neutral, objective, and disinter-
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manner that contrasts with more formal and instrumental aspects of
his comparative analysis, 67 Chaskalson nevertheless rejects the American approach.("
Yet, while rejecting the U.S. approach early in his opinion, Chaskalson continues the dialogue with the United States, conveying respect,
equality, and, most importantly, individuality. It is in this sense that
the court uses comparative law to define its own peer group while
simultaneously creating its individual identity in the international
community.
CONCLUSION
It may be surprising to turn to human rights cases for guidance in
adjudication. Human rights texts often appear naively positivist, idealist and unreconstructed. Moreover, although the Makwanyane and
Callins opinions share a liberal aspiration to foundational rights, they
are in so many ways radically irreconcilable. The Callins opinions are
the product, historically and culturally, of an eighteenth century Bill
of Rights; the Makwanyane opinions are the product of a late-twentieth
century human rights text. Callins reflects, in part, critical jurisprudence; the Makwanyane opinion remains strongly idealist. Blackmun's
opinion in Callins is a pessimistic and critical confessional, weaving a
tale of exasperation at the end of decades of death penalty jurisprudence. Chaskalson's opinion in Makwanyane is a more optimistic, idealistic expression at the dawn of a democracy.
Yet it is these dissonances that expose the vision of mature adjudication that is so promising for the twenty-first century. By means of
transparency, the South African court is able to articulate forcefully the
foundational changes that have taken place in South Africa. At the
same time, transparency itself is a value-creating process. It is a process
that encourages debate and dialogue among all members of society and
has transformative potential for societal values. It is true that transparency may not resolve the charge of false consciousness; and critics of
mature decisions may still believe that the judges are engaged in
ested observer, the comparatist has to regard herself as being involved: involved in an ongoing,
particular social practice constituted and pervaded by law; involved in a given tradition (a peculiar
story of law); and involved in a specific mode of thinking and talking about law. It becomes
clearer then that any vision of the fbreign laws is derived from and shaped by domestic assumptions
and bias.")
67. The court's comparative analysis is, in certain parts, excessively formal or doctrinal. Despite
the fact (recognized by the court) that the South African constitutional text does not resolve the
death penalty issue because the framers deliberately delegated the question to the Constitutional

differences.
Court, Chaskalson repeatedly distinguishes foreign and intemartional law because of textual
This seems overly rigid given the textual indeterminacy of the interim constitution. See Makwanyane, No. CCT/3/94 at 415C-E, 414C-E, 441D-F.
68. Iaiat 422D (Chaskalson).
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conscious or unconscious manipulation, deception or bad faith. However, this critique always remains available, and indeed may constitute
an essential step in the process of maturation.

